INTRODUCTION
Corruption is the use or abuse of public office for private gain. ' Although particular definitions of corruption may be different, its conceptualization appears to be universal, and corruption is universally condemned. 2 Corruption was condemned in the past just the behavior of bribe payers. 11 In essence, these views treat corruption as a conglomeration of discrete failures, which in the aggregate constitute a phenomenon. While such a description of corruption undoubtedly does reflect some aspects of corruption, a differing description may provide fresh insights-and new approaches to addressing corruption. 12 This paper suggests that corruption presents an assurance problem. 13 An assurance problem exists when all actors are better off if they adhere to at least the same minimal standard, but are second best off if, in the event that there are defectors, they join the defectors rather than continue to' adhere to the standards, and are worst off if there are defectors but they do not join those defectors. Actors faced with an assurance problem, therefore, must choose between cooperating in hopes of accruing the greatest benefit or defecting as a defensive measure. 4 The standard solution for an assurance problem is to impose penal sanctions on defectors, but that solution is not possible in endemically corrupt systems. 5 Thus, this paper explores a proposal by the Panamanian group, Asociaci6n Panamefia de Ejecutivos de Empresa ("APEDE"), which offers a viable solution to assurance problems. 6 In order to demonstrate that corruption is an assurance problem, this paper discusses the fact that corrupt relationships are neither TRANSNAT'L L. 877, 906-07 (2000) (discussing changes in the manner in which legal regimes and legal scholars perceive corruption).
See Robert S. Lieken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1996-97, at 55, 68 (suggesting that controlling corruption will require a multiplicity of techniques and approaches).
13. See discussion infra Part III (defining the assurance problem as consistent with game theory wherein survival and success depend on whether actors defect from a group of participants).
14. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing the prisoners' dilemma and the problems with assurance).
15. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (noting that sanctions often do not work in corrupt systems because all institutions, including those that would sanction, are thoroughly corrupt).
16. See discussion infra Part V.C (describing APEDE and its mission to promote ethical conduct among businesses in Panama). desired nor optimal, 7 but that corruption does confer a short-term advantage on parties in endemically corrupt systems. 8 In order to underscore the significance of this issue, however, this paper starts with a discussion of the effect of corruption on emerging economies. 19 Just as perniciously, corruption degrades societies and erodes support for change.
I. CORRUPTION AFFECTS EMERGING ECONOMIES
Corruption affects any polity in a negative manner, but its effects are particularly acute in emerging economies. 2° Indeed, positive change and economic growth cannot occur in endemically corrupt polities. 2 Corruption fosters the creation of expensive parallel institutions, which siphon resources away from other uses. 22 Corruption decreases foreign investment and distorts decisionmaking by bureaucrats. 23
A. PARALLEL INSTITUTIONS
One of the most burdensome and yet least quantified burdens corruption imposes on emerging or developing economies is the cost of maintaining parallel institutions. Parallel institutions are institutions created alongside "official" or extant institutions to 17. See discussion infra Part II (illustrating that while corruption may confer some short-term benefits by facilitating the formation of certain political relationships, a deeper analysis shows that corrupt actors actually degrade these relationships over time).
18. See id. (arguing that certain actors benefit particularly from corruption, when other participating actors are not corrupt).
19. See discussion infra Part I.B (observing that corruption discourages foreign investment, which is vital to the success of emerging economies).
20. See id. (describing the ways that corruption hurts emerging economies, for example, because governments cannot spend necessary funds on other areas).
21. See discussion infra Part I.E (detailing that corrupt institutions do not support a climate for growth).
22. See id. (noting that economies cannot grow economically when institutions are endemically corrupt).
23. See discussion infra Part I.B (noting that foreign investment inevitably decreases where there are indicators of rampant corruption).
[19:1307 perform essentially the same functions as the official institutions. 24 The state can create parallel institutions, for example, when an existing official institution cannot service the needs of all people in need of that institution. More often, however, parallel institutions are a reaction to a failure in the state, either because the state uses its institutions as a means of repressing people, or because the state actively denies access to its institutions to groups of people. Privately created courts provide a striking example of parallel institutions. In the past, for example, rabbinical courts provided Jewish communities with viable, albeit extralegal, alternatives to the corrupt courts of the Ottoman Empire or the brutal courts of the Nazis. 27 Corrupt institutions engender the creation of parallel institutions because corrupt institutions are dysfunctional. 28 They are dysfunctional for a variety of reasons, including the fact that they work in ways other than the ways they were designed to function and in fact often work to the detriment of those they are intended to serve. 29 They are especially dysfunctional because people do not trust public schooling"); see also them and will not use them if it is possible not to do so. 30 In the face of corrupt institutions, therefore, people create parallel institutions. 3 Karen Halverson provides a striking example of the creation of private court-like institutions when state courts are corrupt:
Criminal groups in Russia function to enforce legal rules and resolve economic disputes. One of the ironies of Russian organized crime is that criminal groups have long governed themselves according to internal criminal "laws." Those who rule the criminal world are known as "thieves-in-law" [vory v zakone], and they resolve disputes between criminals (or between businesses protected by them) through a procedure known as a "sorting out" [razborka]. As one Russian described the razborka procedure, it may involve powerful bankers appointing a "barely literate," retired ex-convict to resolve a dispute according to the traditional rules followed in the criminal world. Although often violent, a razborka may resemble a western-style negotiation session where each side brings its attorney and the parties follow the Russian Code of Civil Procedure. Corruption distorts decision-making in two profound ways: by distorting the parameters within which decisions are made, and by distorting the pool of decisionmakers.
Corruption, especially bribery, often involves economic decisions. 45 In a rational market system, decisions about which good or service to purchase are made on the basis of price and quality. 6 On the other hand, rather than purchasing a good or service based on the price and quality, a corrupt decisionmaker makes a decision on the basis of the size and quality of a bribe. 47 Results of such decisionmaking dot the developing world in the form of bridges built where there are no roads, buildings that easily collapse during earthquakes, and other poorly-conceived and wasteful products. 4a Corruption also distorts the pool of bureaucrats who make decisions. 49 Capable and honest persons tend to avoid corrupt bureaucracies. 5 Irrigation Department of a state in southern India, Robert Wade found that corrupt senior officials sold government posts to junior officials who desired those positions because such positions allowed them to extract bribes, thus perpetuating the entry of dishonest and incapable persons into-and the exclusion of honest decisionmakers from-bureaucratic service. 5 While it is possible to find honest bureaucrats even in endemically corrupt systems, 52 the ill effect of corruption on the composition of critical decisionmakers in emerging economies is beyond peradventure.
D. CORRUPTION CORRODES SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND UNDERMINES SUPPORT FOR REFORM
Corruption delegitimizes governments and undermines support for change, particularly market-oriented change. 53 Susan RoseAckerman powerfully summarizes the social affects of corruption and its detrimental effect on the legitimacy of governments: "Citizens may come to believe that the government is simply for sale to the highest bidder. Corruption undermines claims that the government is substituting democratic values for decisions based on ability to pay. It can lead to coups by un-democratic leaders." 54 work for moral reasons when corruption is pervasive); Vito Tanzi, Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1995, at 26 (suggesting that people will seek jobs that pay good bribes rather than jobs for which they are qualified); Francisco E. Thoumi There are two effects that are particularly acute in emerging economies. The first is that popular support for reform erodes, and the absence of that support can seriously undermine the possibility of positive change. 55 The other effect is harder to quantify, but has far more of a human face: corruption contributes to miserable social conditions. 56 As Martin Davies forcefully put it, "we delude ourselves if we think bribery to be purely economic conduct incapable of leading to fear, cruelty, and humiliation. 5 7 E. CORRUPTION PREVENTS DEVELOPMENT Corruption clearly impedes or prevents positive change in emerging economies by distorting, by denying or diverting resources, and by degrading social support. 58 Corruption is detrimental on a macro scale; it is also not the optimal relationship to enter into on a micro scale.
INT'L J. 643, 654 (1998) (noting that respect for law and legal institutions is a "casualty" of bribery); Werlin, supra note 30, at 79 ("the effect of corruption is to generate an atmosphere of distrust which pervades all levels of administration"). Again, this point is borne out by recent, empirical findings of fact rather than theoretical speculation. (1997) (explaining that, however commonplace it might be in practice, most cultures regard bribery as unethical conduct).
Id.
58. See discussion infra Part I (describing the economic and social effect of corruption on society).
II. CORRUPT RELATIONSHIPS ARE NOT DESIRABLE
Corruption does, in some respects, facilitate relationships in the sense that two or more parties transact with one another. 5 9 Indeed, in the post-colonial period of the 1960s, some scholars did suggest that corruption enhanced development by creating an avenue by which foreign investors could enter a developing country. 60 Nathaniel Leff was at that time the most vocal advocate of the "speed money" argument, 6 ' although Samuel Huntington has since become better known. 6 2 Huntington argued that Corruption may be one way of surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations which hamper economic expansion. In the United States, during the 1870s and 1880s, corruption of state legislatures and city councils by railroad, utility, and industrial corporations undoubtedly speeded the growth of the American economy .... A society which is relatively uncorrupt-a traditional society for instance where traditional norms are still powerful-may find a certain amount of corruption a welcome lubricant easing the path to modernization. A developed traditional society may be improved-or at least modernized-by a little corruption. (1994) (stating that corruption can be conceived of as the transferal of a service between the bribe donor and the bribe recipient and generally describing corruption in transactional terms). This statement is not meant to imply that these relationships are beneficial; any positive statement about corruption is in danger of being seized upon by scholars desperate for an argument to skewer. See, e.g. Dickerson, supra note 1, at 397 n. 17 (misquoting the author of this article as suggesting that corruption is beneficial).
60. See Shihata, supra note 2, at 454 (describing-and disagreeing with-procorruption arguments in the literature, including capital formation, predictability in government relationships, and "efficient" escape from burdensome regulations).
61. See Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Nov. 1964, at 10, 10-11 (stating that bribes are speed money that allow productive businesses to bypass recalcitrant bureaucracies).
62. Time has proven these scholars wrong, and a more sophisticated understanding of corruption helps to explain why. The speed money argument relies on a static analysis of benefits: the cost directly attributable to a transaction is subtracted from the benefit directly accruing from a transaction. 64 Static analysis is no longer considered an accurate measure of the effects of corruption. 65 Instead, a dynamic analysis that considers the damage done to a system over a period of time is considered more accurate, and does not favor the use of corruption as a development tool. (1997) (stating that by using a dynamic analysis, what appears to be a short-term gain can be shown to impose tremendous costs in the long run); Buscaglia supra note 37, at 112 (noting that "present corruption decreases future productivity, thereby reducing dynamic efficiency"); Shihata, supra note 2, at 454-55 (positing that the consensus among scholars is that the long-term damage done by corruption far outweighs any immediate benefits to obtain telephone service in India: his original premise was that the payment of differently sized bribes would help to differentiate customers in a system that otherwise was completely egalitarian, and thus bribes would allow for Pareto optimalization. Id. Rashid found that while this may have been the case at first, over time, bureaucrats came to expect bribes and also created inefficiencies in order to extract more and larger bribes; rather than contributing to Pareto optimality, bribery degraded the system. Id.
67. See FRITZ F. HEIMANN, SHOULD FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A CRIME 7 (1994). some reason to trust one another. 68 Corruption also creates barriers to relationships by allowing corrupt actors to buy monopolies from the state. 69 Relationships formed through corruption are generally more burdensome to actors than legitimate relationships. 70 Far from cutting through red tape, corrupt relationships actually consume more time and are more costly to maintain. Corrupt relationships bear a risk of discovery and punishment, as well as the monetary cost of maintaining secrecy. 71 Corrupt relationships are not enforceable in public institutions, and therefore must be enforced through more costly means. Corrupt relationships also corrode the internal culture of a bribe-paying company. 72 The myth that "corruption is how business is done" or that "corruption is acceptable" in some systems 73 does not stand up to close scrutiny. 74 Certainly, corruption has become endemic in some 68 . See Alam, supra note 48, at 449 (stating that bribe-taking officials limit entry to those whom they trust). 16 (1989) (providing examples of how bribes are used to obtain or retain monopolies). The author of this article notes that he has spoken with many businesspeople who purchased a monopoly through a bribe, only to find that the same monopoly was sold to other bribe payers, or whose monopoly was later revoked in favor of a later payer of a better-quality bribe.
70. See Alam, supra note 48, at 449 (describing how bribery may create costs when bureaucrats hold back information and resources in order to extract larger bribes).
71. See Schlieffer & Vishny, supra note 43, at 600 (noting that there are costs imposed by the "imperative of secrecy").
72. See Cragg, supra note 54, at 653 (noting that the payment of bribes creates an environment in which employees think that it is appropriate to put their own interests ahead of those of the company). 76. As one corruption expert notes, The incidence of grand corruption has increased tremendously during the last decade. What used to concern a relatively small number of people working in a relatively small number of countries has now become a major South-wide problem.... [By] general consensus, there has been a tremendous deterioration in the last ten years, with grand corruption becoming the general rule, rather than the exception, in major government-influenced contracts in the South. In short, corruption not only corrodes a society in general, it also imposes burdens on those who are involved in corrupt relationships.
GEORGE MOODY-STUART, THE GOOD BUSINESS GUIDE TO BRIBERY: GRAND
A corrupt relationship is sometimes better than no relationship at all, but it is not the type of relationship that a rational actor would voluntarily choose. 83
III. CORRUPTION PRESENTS AN ASSURANCE PROBLEM
Corruption imposes generalized costs, and a corrupt relationship is rarely optimal. Nonetheless, corruption can confer a short-term benefit on an actor, and maintaining high standards when others are corrupt could prove fatal to an actor. 84 Corruption, therefore, presents actors with a dilemma often referred to as an assurance problem. 85 of which have been published, but all of which indicated that societies in those countries reject corruption. Corruption confers a short-term benefit over legitimate actors because corruption distorts the decision-making process. s6 According to traditional neo-classical economic theory, a decisionmaker makes a decision based on the price and fit of a good or service. 8 " A rational producer, therefore, uses resources to lower the price of a product and to enhance its quality. 88 In a corrupt system, on the other hand, the price or quality of the product is irrelevant. 89 The decisionmaker bases the decision instead on the size and quality of the bribe. 90 A rational, albeit corrupt, producer, therefore, uses its resources to increase the size of the bribe and improve the quality of the bribe rather than quality of the product. 9 Assuming that resources are finite and that producers initially have roughly equal access to those resources, a producer who uses even a portion of its resources legitimately will not be able to create a bribe of the same size or 90. See Heimann, supra note 67, at 7 (explaining that a high-quality bribe is a bribe that a corrupt bureaucrat can use without fear of discovery or punishment, and that "bribes everywhere have to be paid in secret").
91. quality as a producer who dedicates all of its resources to creating a good bribe.
Corruption degrades systems and societies and, in the long-run, imposes heavy costs on all actors. 92 All actors are better off if a system operates without corruption. Few people accept corruption, and it is conceivable that most actors would prefer not to engage in corrupt acts. Nonetheless, corruption can confer a short-term benefit, and if one actor engages in corruption, then in the short run that actor has a significant advantage over those who do not. 93 Corruption, therefore, presents a paradigmatic assurance problem.
The assurance problem is most often described with the descriptors of game theory. 94 As such, it can be contrasted with the far better-known prisoners' dilemma game. In a prisoners' dilemma situation, an actor is best off if he or she defects while everyone else complies and is next best off if everyone complies. 95 In an assurance 92. See discussion infra Part II (explaining that it is more difficult and inefficient to maintain a corrupt relationship than a legitimate relationship). . 31, 2004) . In a prisoners' dilemma game, players are each offered a set of choices about whether to defect from the group or not; if one player defects and no others do, then that player is best off and the other players are worst off, however, if no player defects, then the players are next best off, and if all of the players defect then they suffer more than if none of the players had defected. Id. The prisoners' dilemma game is a tool that "illustrates a conflict between individual and group rationality. A group whose members pursue rational self-interest may all end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to rational self-problem, on the other hand, all actors will be best off if all actors coordinate their behavior, but in the event that there are defectors, those who defect are better off than those who do not defect. 96 The assurance problem is often illustrated through games similar to the prisoners' dilemma game. One of the more common is the stag hunt game, based on a scenario created by Jean Jacques Rousseau. 97 A group of hunters can successfully hunt and kill a stag, which they will share, if they coordinate their efforts. 98 Alternatively, they could defect and hunt a rabbit, which is a smaller animal but which an individual hunter could probably kill by himself. 99 The hunters who continue to hunt a stag after others have defected will not be successful and will have nothing. 00 The dilemma faced by an individual hunter is that if she does her job for the group she will get a large portion of meat-if every other hunter does his or her job as well; but if she does her job for the group and someone else defects, she will not only get nothing but will also have passed up an opportunity to get a medium portion by not defecting herself.' An interest." Id. at 1. economic actor in a potentially corrupt system faces a similar dilemma. If she behaves appropriately and everyone else does, as well, she will join the others in reaping a large reward; but if others defect and she does not join them, their small gain will surpass hers and she may starve.
See infra
Mathematicians can calculate elegant solutions to hypothetical games.
10 2 These solutions obviously have little application in the real world, because both the vastly greater number of actors in real life 13 and the vastly greater complexity of real life cannot be replicated in a game."0 Nonetheless, the insights gained through game theory are of use to persons constructing real social structures, and although a mathematically calculated solution may have little application, the general concept of a solution may be valuable. Unfortunately, the most obvious solution probably will not work. retaliation, which he labeled "tit-for-tat," would lead to coordinated behavior and the accrual of the maximal benefit for all. 1 " 6 While sanctions can be imposed through a variety of sources, the most common is criminal law. Indeed, John Rawls famously found "no need even for the penal law except insofar as the assurance problem [makes] it necessary." ' 1 0 7
IV. PUNITIVE LEGAL SANCTIONS DO NOT SOLVE
In the case of an endemically corrupt system, however, criminal sanctions often do not constitute a viable means of ensuring compliance with minimal standards of behavior. 108 The reasons for this are fairly obvious: non-enforcement of enforcement standards can be purchased through a corrupt relationship. Panama in general and APEDE in particular illustrate that corruption is sometimes best understood as an assurance problem, and also provide a solution to the problem that is independent of criminal law."' Corruption almost certainly exists in Panama, and APEDE's members, who are prominent businesspeople, are among those best poised to reap the short-terms gains of corrupt relationships. Nonetheless, APEDE's members recognize that corruption imposes tremendous costs both on themselves and on their country, and are actively seeking means to establish and enforce standard behavior among all members. around three-fourths of Panama's gross domestic product." 6 Panama's government, installed after the United States invaded Panama to overthrow its military dictatorship, consists of a constitutional democracy with a President, a unicameral Asamblea Legislativa, and a Corte Suprema de Justicia.II 7 Panama is a vibrant and economically active polity that possesses control over arguably the most important waterway in the worldthe Panama Canal.' 18 Panamanians should enjoy tremendous success, yet a great deal of evidence indicates that corruption is a serious problem in Panama. (discussing the involvement of Roosevelt and J.P. Morgan in Panama's liberation from Columbia). Espino's argument, of course, discounts the contributions of so many Panamanians whose serious commitment to the independence of their country was probably the most significant contributor to Panama's independence. the early years of its independence, Panama and the United States were inextricably intertwined in a hegemonic relationship in which the United States controlled and at the same time protected those in power in Panama. 125 Again, the control exerted over Panama by the United States is a reason to infer corruption.
126
A third reason to infer corruption is that an authoritarian regime appeared in Panama once the United States relinquished its control. For many years, military generals actually ruled Panama, even on those occasions when an elected president sat in office. 127 The last of Panama's military dictators was Manuel Noriega, who for many years worked closely with and even for the United States, but who in the end was finally removed from office with the assistance of a U.S. (2003) ("Predictably, the hegemon will move to corrupt the community's system of law by using its power to lift its actions beyond adverse adjudication, to bar enforcement of the law against its inevitable wrongs, and to demand and construct or impose pseudo-legal rationales and strategies that shield its objectives by attempting to credibly justify its drive for community control."); see also Chantal Thomas, International Debt Forgiveness and Global Poverty Reduction, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1711, 1714 (2000) (noting that during the Cold War, the United States was willing to support corrupt regimes in exchange for those regimes' support). The fourth issue that allows for in inference of corruption in Panama is that the country has been a center for money laundering and a hub for drug transshipments. As recently as a decade ago, Silvano Paternostro described Panama as a country in "chaos" because of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. 33 141. gQu es APEDE?, supra note 139 (elaborating that APEDE achieves its mission through initiatives such as the Conferencia Annual de Ejecutivos de Empresa, which focuses on issues ranging from poverty reduction to the administration of justice and economic develop, or the Law on Transparency, which scrutinizes the public administration and advocates for accountability).
142. See id. (stating that its activities also include promoting equal opportunity, education, urban development, and business training).
143. See id. (explaining that "APEDE's Ethics and Civic Affairs Commission is leading the business sector in the fight against corruption."); see also DE OBARRIO, supra note 140, at 1 (stating that the primary goal of APEDE is to promote transparency in government and ethical conduct in private companies).
APEDE's involvement is interesting for at least two reasons. The first is that business is a vastly underappreciated resource in combating corruption. Throughout the world, from the Clean Hands movement in Poland to the Development Coalition in South Africa, businesses are acting to curb corruption. 144 Indeed, private individuals and businesses initially funded Transparency International, the driver of much global activity with respect to corruption. 45 Businesses constitute a potent adversary to systemic corruption because they are funded, organized, and habituated to achieving discrete goals.
The second reason why APEDE's involvement is interesting is that it underscores the fact that corruption can be described as an assurance problem. APEDE clearly recognizes that corrupt relationships are not optimal, and also clearly recognizes that defection from minimal standards of behavior could be perceived as a necessary defense mechanism by which actors hope to hedge against other defectors. Indeed, APEDE explicitly recognizes private sector parties acting in an ethical fashion as the most probable means of effectuating changes in the government sector. 146 APEDE has initiated educational programs on corruption, and is working with the government to create laws on transparency and accountability. 47 Among the most intriguing of APEDE's ideas, however, is the proposal that the organization certify companies based upon how they make decisions regarding potentially corrupt situations. The idea of certifying decision-making processes is not novel. Two of the best-known sets of privately created standards deal with decision-making processes rather than with the actual makeup of goods or services. The International Standards Organization's ISO 9000 group of standards concerns quality management processes, 4 ' while its ISO 14000 group concerns environmental management processes.
1 49 The International Standards Organization is instructive in contemplating a certification process for decisions about corruption because they create "generic management system standards."' ' 0 By "generic," the organization means "the same standards can be applied to any organization, large or small, whatever its product-including whether its 'product' is actually a service-in any sector of activity."' ' 1 By "management system," the organization means "what the organization does to manage its processes, or activities in order that the products or services that it produces meet the objectives it has set itself."' 52 By "management system standards," the organization means "a model to follow in setting up and operating the management system. Experts in the field have reached a consensus that this model is built on "state of the art practices. "' 53 Businesses that wish to receive certification go through an auditing process.' 54 In the audit, an auditor examines each stage of decision-making and of effectuating decisions against a template of internationally-accepted best practices. If needed, the auditor suggests processes designed to improve decision-making to meet those best practices. When the processes under scrutiny conform with international standards, then the auditor issues a written assurance to that effect. The business may, if it chooses, ask the auditor to register that assurance in a central registry. 55 The advantage to a business of this certification is fourfold. First, decision-making processes may be improved. 5 6 More effective management processes are obviously to any business's advantage.57 The second, third and fourth advantages are less obvious, but far greater in scope.
The second advantage is that certification adds reputational value. This is particularly true with respect to the environmental management system group of standards. Much of the public in many of the world's regions are quite sensitive to the environmental behavior of a supplier.' 58 public that a given firm makes environmental decisions in an appropriate manner.' 59 Third, certification makes a business's product or service cheaper by reducing the transaction costs involved in investigating that business. 1 60 Potential buyers, particularly those contemplating longterm or multiple-repeat arrangements, must investigate many aspects of a potential supplier, including the supplier's quality assurance processes. 1 6 1 Such investigations can be particularly expensive when businesses are physically distant from one another or when one of the businesses is in a remote location. 6 2 Given the choice between suppliers that appear equal in every other way, a rational buyer will choose the supplier that will be cheaper to investigate. ISO 9000 certification significantly reduces the cost of investigation because someone else has completed a substantial part of the investigation of the business that has received certification has already been done.
Finally, conforming to internationally-accepted standards lowers the risk that a business will be found legally liable for its behaviors (although, of course, conformity does not entirely eliminate that risk).
an independent auditor would have to find a process for training each person who makes decisions for a business in both the content and use of the code.
A code, though laudatory, is not by itself sufficient. Certification should also examine decision-making processes and impose at least three structural requirements. First, decisions that are at risk of involving corruption must be approved by multiple and distinct parties. Second, managers must make all decisions in a transparent fashion so that observers can assign responsibility to an accountable party. Finally, an enterprise must account for all of it's funds in a manner that precludes the creation of slush funds that could be used to finance bribes. 169 Upon binding itself to an appropriate code, meaningful training in that code, a decision-making process that spreads out authority but focuses accountability and responsibility, and a financial accounting process that prevents the creation of secret funds, a business could be certified and that certification registered. 70 Companies could agree that they would only conduct business with other certified companies, and the government could require that companies who wish to conduct business with the government be certified. Foreign parties might also require certification of their Panamanian business partners. 7 ' In these ways, certification would become a critical attribute for conducting business.
Each of the four benefits that arise from the International Standards Organization certification process would accrue to businesses adhering to this certification model. 72 First, clearer direction and training in dealing with complex situations improves management, and improved management inures to the benefit of a corrupt actors generally hide their activities, the discovery of their conduct leads to increased costs). business. Corruption presents a complex situation that the code would help actors navigate. 173 Second, certification also would confer reputational benefits. A majority of people condemn corruption. 174 Most people also perceive corrupt relationships to be harmful. 175 Certification is a signal that a particular business does not engage in this form of conduct.
Third, certification also makes a good or service cheaper, particularly for foreign buyers. In addition to the general distaste that most businesses have for corrupt relationships, an increasing number of jurisdictions criminalize transnational bribery, and thus an increasing number of businesses are required to investigate possible corrupt relationships among those with whom they might conduct business. 176 A meaningful certification process would signal to these foreign entities that they could safely conduct business with a certified business without the transaction costs that would otherwise be associated with entering into a business partnership.
Finally, certification would also mitigate the risk of future legal liability. Actors in emerging economies face two challenges that increase the risk of future liability. The first is that, by definition, the laws and regulations in emerging economies undergo a great deal of change.
17 7 The second is that as societies emerge from endemically corrupt regimes, it is quite possible that they will impose liability retroactively on the businesses with which those regimes entered into corrupt relationships. 178. The difficulties experienced by businesses in Indonesia who had been Most importantly, a certification process addresses the assurance problem that corruption presents. Corrupt relationships are not optimal, and most actors would prefer to avoid them, but might not be able to do so without assurances that other actors are behaving in accordance. 179 A certification process provides such an assurance. 1
80
First, a very clear standard is established for conduct by all actors. Second, the conduct of actors is monitored. Third, defection is penalized, not by dysfunctional state institutions, but instead by a diffuse marketplace.
CONCLUSION
Corruption is a serious impediment to positive change in emerging economies. As such, it merits the attention given to it by both policymakers and scholars. Too often, however, that scrutiny analyzes corruption as simply a failure of enforcement, and does not take into account the choices facing an actor in an endemically corrupt setting.'' A more textured understanding of corruption reveals that corruption often presents an assurance problem.' 82 Actors do not want to enter into corrupt relationships and they understand that both 181. See discussion infra Part II (noting that the complexity of corruption requires many differing solutions).
182. See discussion infra Part III (suggesting that corruption is an assurance problem). they and their society are better off if they do not.' 83 In the absence, however, of assurances that their competitors are not acting corruptly, actors who behave honestly risk losing everything. 184 Unfortunately, the usual solution to an assurance problem-penal law--does not work in endemically corrupt systems.' 85 The certification process suggested by APEDE solves the assurance problem. 8 6 Businesses are assured that other actors are complying, and know that those who do not will be punished by the marketplace. Certification also confers other benefits that make it attractive.
Certification alone will not eradicate corruption. It does, however, constitute an important component in the bundle of structures that will, and it highlights a better understanding of an ancient but still too little-understood phenomenon.
183. See Jun, supra note 78, at 1085 (noting that although corruption may be a prevalent practice in Korea, it is not a morally acceptable practice).
184. See Rousseau, supra note 97 and accompanying text (stating that, consistent with the underlying rationale of the stag hunt, actors who coordinate their actions will be best off, but when there are defectors, those who do not defect risk losing everything).
185. See WORLD BANK, supra note 34, at 13 (highlighting the problems associated with corruption within official enforcement bodies in endemically corrupt systems).
186. See discussion infra Part V (describing the process that APEDE uses in attempting to solve assurance problems).
